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The obligation of sincere co-operation[i] of all Member States of the European Union entails, 
inter alia, the national governments to comply with judgements of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) and adjust national measures accordingly. Timely and appropriate 
compliance initiatives would be seen as acting in good faith and in line with the sincere co-
operation principle. Persistent non-compliance with judgements remains a problem and it 
particularly arises in cases where national governments’ influence over former strategic state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), such as the largest Italian energy/oil company ENI, the former 
state telecommunication monopoly Telecom Italia and dominant electricity giant ENEL, is at 
stake. 
This non-compliance stems from the basic conflict between the liberalisation aims of the 
Union and egoistic interests of certain Member States, which sought to retain influence over 
strategic industries by employing specific Control Enhancing Mechanisms called ‘golden 
shares’. Golden shares are the special class of shares introduced for the sole benefit of the 
‘former owner’ – the state. These mechanisms aim at enhancing governmental control after 
privatisation, thus protecting important industries from turbulences of the free market. A 
typical golden share could have the following structure: where direct influence was lost due 
to privatisation, special powers, such as the power to veto the usage and disposal of strategic 
assets and the right to appoint directors, is attached to the golden shares held by the state. 
These mechanisms are eagerly employed by the Member States’ governments and ever so 
eagerly battled by the European Commission and the CJEU. Golden shares are illegal, unless 
justified by overriding public interest and the necessity to protect public security, are legally 
certain, appropriate and non-discriminative.[ii] The justification criterion is narrow, however 
some governments were not only willing to face the CJEU, but were also determined to 
continue using already overruled golden shares post-judgement. Such tactics allow the 
matters to drag, contributing to a free-rider problem, which in turn means acting in bad faith 
and contrary to the principle of sincere co-operation, thus causing obstinate non-compliance 
and undermining the authority of the CJEU. 
There are fifteen cases that relate to golden shares and only in one of them the use of these 
measures has been justified.[iii] After the condemning judgement is passed, the Member 
State in question is obliged to comply without delay and either to severely restrict its golden 
shares or to repeal them altogether. Taking into account the success rate on justifying golden 
shares, it could be ascertained that following a condemning judgement the Member State in 
question is obliged not to try and amend but repeal them, since passing the justification test is 
a challenging task. Some Member States have disclosed a remarkable persistence in non-
compliance alongside the determination to retain golden shares in spite of condemning 
judgements and looming sanction threats. Italy could be seen as one of such examples of 
persistent bad-faith compliance with four cases upon it, three of which relate to obstinate 
golden share Decree-Law No.332/1994.[iv] Italian authorities have not addressed judgements 
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in good faith and the same golden share measures were effective for more than a decade post-
judgement. 
The first ruling on golden shares has been on Italian Decree-Law No.332/1994, which 
governed privatisation of SOEs.[v] Article 2 of the Decree-Law prescribed the 
implementation of further decrees which would create a golden share in certain strategic 
companies. The Decree-Law No.332/1994 did not infringe the Treaty by itself, as it merely 
empowered certain authorities to ‘activate’ it by further company-specific decrees, stating 
which company shall be protected and how. Since the Decree-Law does not infringe the 
Community law per se – as long as the exercise of golden shares (laid down in further 
decrees) passes the justification test – it becomes ‘untouchable’ in a way that it allows for a 
numerous amendments to ‘activating’ decrees. If golden shares ought to be found applied in 
unjustified manner, the ways in which they are applied could be changed, without the 
necessity to change the Decree-law itself. The conditions for exercise of golden shares, or 
more precisely – their absence, have become the subject of the CJEU’s judgement on case C-
58/99 in which the Commission sued Italy under what is now Article 258 TFEU. In 2000, in 
absence of any justifications, the CJEU found that the application of golden has been illegal. 
Even though the Italian government has expressed its willingness to comply prior to the 
judgement, no adequate amendments were undertaken following the condemning ruling. 
The amendments which aimed at justifying the golden shares at stake were transposed into 
Article 66 of Financial Law No. 488 of 23 December 1999 and the ‘activating’ decree of 11 
February 2000.[vi] This compliance measure aimed to provide a detailed explanation under 
which circumstances and how the GSs of the Decree-Law No.332/1994 should be executed, 
but failed to do so. These amendments were of declamatory character as they were merely 
repeating the requirements of the justification, while failing to specify what precisely the 
circumstances for their exercise are. This in turn retained the possibility of further disputes 
over legality of golden shares, which inevitably followed. The compliance initiative of 
Article 66 Financial Law No.488/1999 acted as a smoke screen dispersing the attention from 
active golden shares. Acting in good faith would entail the Italian government, first and 
foremost, to abstain from vague and inadequate justification attempts which delayed final 
compliance as well as to abstain from implementation of new golden shares. Nonetheless, in 
2001 following the condemning judgement on case C-58/99, the Italian government 
implemented another golden share Decree-Law No.192/2001, which has been overruled by 
the CJEU in case C-174/04.[vii] In that case the Italian government tried once again to fiddle 
with the golden share amendments, but after being threatened with sanctions under Article 
260 TFEU it has fully abrogated contested provisions in 2006. Italian authorities have 
complied with the judgement on case C-174/04 but it took one unsuccessful amendment and 
potential of application of penalties to achieve this.  
As for the first Italian case on golden shares C-58/99, the Article 2 of Decree-Law 
No.332/1994 became subject of the CJEU’s preliminary ruling in Federconsumatori and later 
in judgment on case C-326/07. In 2007 the CJEU has once again pointed on the 
incompatibility of the Decree-Law No.332/1994 with the Community law in 
Federconsumatori, confirming the obstinacy of the golden shares. In this case the golden 
shares emerge in a newly amended format after yet another justification attempt via the new 
Article 4(227) to (231) Law No.350 of 24 December 2003 and implementing Decree of 10 
June 2004.[viii] This justification attempt emerged as a legislative answer to the 
Commission’s formal letter sent in February 2003, a second action under Article 258 TFEU 
on the Decree-Law No.332/1994. The Italian authorities undertook to introduce new 
amendments by the end of 2003. The Law No.350 of 24 December 2003 was implemented in 
time. However, it did not contain justifications, but merely created a platform for subsequent 
justification, by further Decree of 10 June 2004. However, the latter amendments were also 
insufficient to justify the use of golden shares. The new provisions of Law No.350 alongside 
the Decree of 2004, have limited golden shares and introduced justifications based on ‘real 
and serious risk’ without specifying what exactly constitutes such risk. 
These amendments became subject of the second condemning judgment of the CJEU in 2009 
on case C-326/07. Since compliance did not follow and no drafts were submitted for a 
review, the Commission proceeded with sanction-threats under Article 260 TFEU. On 20 
May 2010 Italy’s then Prime Minister Berlusconi has issued a decree which aimed at 
addressing the Commission’s concerns and the Court’s ruling(s) by amending the criteria for 
execution of special powers laid down in ‘activating’ Decree of 10 June 2004.[ix] The 
compliance measure of Berlusconi’s Decree appears to be even more controversial, as it 
comprised of just one Article that in turn comprised of a single sentence which repeals 
contested justifications of Decree 10 June 2004! [x] Berlusconi’s Decree repeals Article 1(2) 
of the Decree (the one that laid down the criteria for exercise of special powers of Decree-
Law No.332/1994 and has been overruled by the CJEU in case C-326/07). By eliminating the 
sole justifications of exercise of golden shares Berlusconi has ‘addressed’ the judgment. The 
only justification of special powers has now been repealed and this ‘compliance initiative’ 
does neither justify nor eliminate golden shares as such. Berlusconi’s Decree of 20 May 2010 
appears to be a misleading measure that only aimed at further procrastination, acting as 
another smoke screen. 
On 16 February 2011 the Commission has started the second stage of infringement 
proceedings and issued a reasoned opinion urging Italy to comply. During that time the 
Italian government has been going through one of the most difficult economic and political 
situations in its modern history: the European Debt crisis. It has been a ‘lucky co-incidence’ 
that the need to adopt new golden share amendments has co-incised with some radical 
changes within the Italian government. Berlusconi and his government had to resign on 12 
February 2011 while the new ‘technocratic’ government had to be formed in order to 
implement severe austerity measures. A new Prime Minister has been formally appointed – 
Mario Monti, the former EU Competition Commissioner, known for his tough stance on pro-
European integration and competition enhancement. The technocratic government would stay 
in office until the elections in April 2013. By that time several ‘unpopular’ economic and 
social reforms have to be introduced and new provisions on golden shares would fall within 
that scope. 
After more than a decade of procrastination, the Italian government seems to have finally 
addressed the issue of golden shares overruled back in 2000 by significantly amending the 
original provisions by new Decree-Law No.21 of 15 March 2012.[xi] This new Decree-Law 
No.21/2012 establishes a notion of ‘strategic assets’ which are subject to golden shares and 
introduces a ‘fit-and-proper’ test for potential investors who seek participation in control of 
strategic companies. The golden share provisions now appear to have a considerably 
narrower scope of application and increased legal certainty. But yet again, the contested 
golden share provisions have been amended, not repealed, which in turn has the potential to 
be incompatible with the EC law. The Commission is currently analysing new provisions and 
awaits the implementation of the ‘activating’ Decrees which would further establish the 
conditions for the applications of golden shares. Whether or not Italy has finally complied 
with both golden share cases C-58/99 and C-326/07 remains to be seen, while the battle for 
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